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Why do we believe that more money will buy us more happiness (when in fact it does not)? In 
this paper, we propose a model to explain this puzzle. The model incorporates both adaptation 
and social comparison. A rational person who fully accounted for the dynamics of these factors 
would indeed buy more happiness with money. We argue that projection bias, the tendency to 
project our current reference levels into the future, precludes subjects from correctly calculating 
the utility obtained from consumption. Projection bias has two effects. First, it makes people 
overrate the happiness that they will obtain from money. Second, it makes people misallocate 
their consumption budget by consuming too much at the beginning of the planning horizon, or 
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“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are 
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, 
Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.” 
– The Declaration of Independence, July 4, 1776 
 
In this paper, we propose a model of adaptation and social comparison that provides insight 
into the following puzzle: 
Why do we believe that more money will buy us more happiness (when in fact it does 
not)? 
The key argument is that people overrate the impact money will have on improving happiness 
(well-being). They do this because they do not fully account for the adaptation to a higher 
standard of living that accompanies their higher level of income. Further, a permanent increase 
in income for all peers (e.g., a company-wide pay raise) leaves an individual in the same social 
position as before the increase. These two forces, adaptation and social comparison, make it 
difficult to raise the average well-being of society through economic growth alone. 
Some segments of the population may indeed benefit from economic growth. For example, 
nouveau riche people who move from a lower income group to a higher income group will 
show a higher level of well-being (at least temporarily). Sophisticated individuals who fully 
account for adaptation and social comparison can also benefit from economic growth, as they 
will keep consumption low in early periods in order to be able to sustain an increasingly 
accelerated consumption plan. 
In Section 2, we present our model in which the overall utility of a consumption stream 
depends on relative consumption with respect to a reference level of consumption. The 
                                              
∗ The authors are thankful to Professor Steven Lippman (UCLA) for his helpful suggestions.  
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reference level itself is influenced by one’s past consumption (adaptation) and the average 
consumption of one’s peer group (social comparison). 
In Section 3, we show that our model is consistent with the two key findings in the well-being 
literature. These findings are: [1] happiness scores in developed countries are flat in spite of 
considerable increases in average income; and [2] there is a positive relationship between 
individual income and happiness within a society at any given point in time. 
In Section 4, we derive the optimal consumption plan using our model and show how a rational 
individual will plan consumption over time. We also derive the indirect utility of income under 
the assumption of optimal planning. This utility indeed increases with income. 
In Section 5, we resolve the puzzle posed at the start of our paper using evidence from 
psychology that shows that people underestimate the effects of adaptation, which causes them 
to overestimate the utility that will be derived from a permanent increase in income. 
We make a distinction between basic goods and adaptive goods. Basic goods (food, social 
relationships, sleep) exhibit little or no adaptation. In Section 6, we show why people tend to 
allocate higher than optimal income to adaptive goods, at the expense of basic goods. 
Finally in Section 7, we conclude our findings and provide some implications of our model for 
economic policy and well-being research. 
2. Adaptation – Social Comparison Model 
Suppose () 12 , ,..., T x xx is a consumption stream, where  t x is the consumption in period  . t  What 
is the total utility that an individual (consumer) obtains from such a stream? The Discounted 














Where  () t v x   is the utility of consuming  t x  in period t, and 
t δ is the discount factor 
associated with period  . t  
The DU Model assumes consumption independence, which means that the utility derived from 
present consumption is not affected by past consumption (Samuelson, 1937; Koopmans, 1960). 
It is easy to see that in the DU Model an increase in income permits a higher level of 
consumption and, therefore, total utility will indeed increase as income increases. For a concave 
v, gains in total utility will be smaller and smaller as income increases. 
In Figure 1, average happiness is plotted against income per capita for several countries. 
Several books discuss the measurement and empirical issues dealing with happiness within a 
country and across countries (Kahneman, Diener, and Schwarz, 1999; Van Praag and Ferrer i 
Carbonell, 2004; Frey and Stutzer, 2002a; Layard, 2005). It is clear from this figure that average 
happiness in poorer countries is lower than that in wealthier countries. Political issues such as 
democracy, freedom and individual rights also influence happiness, which is distinctly lower in 
former communist countries (Frey and Stutzer, 2002a).  
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In wealthier societies the basic needs of the people are, by and large, satisfied. In poorer 
countries, progress is needed to address the problems of hunger, shelter, disease and in some 
cases social turmoil caused by war and violence. It is therefore not a surprise that average 
happiness is lower in poorer countries. The happiness curve in Figure 1 is consistent with the 
diminishing marginal utility of income. Beyond a certain level of income, say $15,000 per year, 
happiness does not increase much with income. 
 
Figure 1 















Easterlin (1974, 2001) has argued that happiness has not increased over time in spite of 
significant increases in real income per capita in wealthier nations. Easterlin’s hypothesis of 
“no” marginal utility cannot be supported by the DU Model. Further, consumption 
independence – a crucial assumption of the DU Model – is not supported by empirical and 
behavioral studies (Loewenstein, Read and Baumeister, 2003). 
There is considerable evidence that the utility derived from consumption depends crucially on 
two fac- tors: [1] adaptation or habituation to previous consumption levels, and [2] social 
comparison with a reference or peer group (Layard, 2005; Frederick and Loewenstein, 1999; 
Frank, 1985, 1997, 1999; Easterlin, 1995; Brickman, Coates, and Janoff-Bullman, 1978; Clark, 
1996). 
A woman who drives a rusty old compact car as a student may find temporary joy upon 
acquiring a new sedan when she lands her first job, but she soon adapts to driving the new car 
and assimilates it as a part of her lifestyle. Brickman, Coates, and Janoff-Bullman (1978) find  
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that lottery winners report only slightly higher levels of life satisfaction than the control group 
just a year after their win (4.0 versus 3.8 on a 5-point scale). Clark (1996) finds evidence that 
job satisfaction – a component of well-being – is strongly related to changes in pay, but not 
levels of pay. A crucial implication of adaptation is that the utility derived from the same 
$3,000 per month worth of consumption is quite different for someone who is used to 
consuming that amount of goods and services than for someone who is used to consuming only 
$2,000 per month.
1 
Several authors have proposed models that account for adaptation in the determination of the 
total utility of a consumption stream (Ryder and Heal, 1973; Pollak, 1970; Wathieu, 1997, 
2004). Baucells and Sarin (2006b) incorporate satiation from past consumption in a 
modification of the DU model. 
In addition to adaptation, the utility derived from consumption also depends on the 
consumption of others in a person’s peer group. Driving a new Toyota sedan when everyone 
else in the peer group drives a new Lexus sedan seems quite different than if others in the peer 
group drove economy cars. Frank (1985, 1997) provides evidence from the psychological and 
behavioral economics literature that well-being or satisfaction depends heavily on social 
comparison. Solnick and Hemenway (1998, Table 2) asked students 
in the School of Public Health at Harvard to choose between living in one of two imaginary 
worlds in which prices were the same: 
1.  In the first world, you get $50,000 a year, while other people get $25,000 a year (on 
average). 
2.  In the second world, you get $100,000 a year, while other people get $250,000 a year 
(on average). 
A majority of students choose the first type of world. 
People are likely to compare themselves with those who are similar in income and status. A 
university professor is unlikely to compare herself with a movie star or a homeless person. She 
will most likely compare her lifestyle to those of other professors at her university and similarly 
situated colleagues at other, comparable universities. Medvec, Madey and Gilovich (1995) find 
that Olympic bronze medalists are happier than Olympic silver medalists, as the former compare 
themselves to the athletes who got no medal at all, whereas the latter have nightmares of 
missing the gold. After the unification of Germany, East Germans’ level of happiness fell as 
their comparison group shifted from people in other former Soviet block countries to people 
from West Germany (Layard, 2005). Morawetz (1977) found that people living in a community 
where variation in income is small are happier than those living in a community with a higher 
absolute income, but a more unequal income distribution. It is possible that in a recession or 
downturn, when everyone gets a uniform pay cut, happiness may not go down, but in 
prosperity, differential increases in pay can cause unhappiness. 
We cannot, however, simply improve our happiness by imagining more unfortunate 
individuals. Kahneman and Miller (1986) assert that to influence our hedonic state, 
counterfactuals must be plausible, not just possible alternatives to reality. The all-too-common 
                                              
1 People may not fully adapt to unemployment, loss of a spouse, noise and other unfortunate and stressful situations. 
The adaptation rate is high for material goods, but a healthy marriage or good social relationships provide 
undiminished joy.  
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tactic of parents coaxing a child to appreciate food by reminding them of starving children in 
Africa does not work. Instead, the same child will be far more likely to appreciate a warm apple 
cider after a little league game in the cold (Parducci, 1995). 
We note that it is possible that through spiritual practices such as meditation or prayer, one might 
gain a better perspective on life and reduce the harmful effects of comparison; however, such a 
practice requires considerable time, effort and discipline. For this study, we assume that the social 
comparison level is exogenously specified; though a theory where the appropriate peer group and 
social comparison level is endogenous would be useful. 
 
We now state our model of adaptation and social comparison: 
 









V xx v x r δ
−
=
=− ∑  (1) 
  () 1 , 1, ..., , tt t r sa t T σσ =+ − =  (2) 
  () 11 1 , 2, ..., , tt t a xa t T αα −− =+ − =  (3) 
1 a , and  , 1,..., , t s tT =  are given. 
In the above model,  t r  is the reference level in period t. The reference level is a convex 
combination of social comparison level,  , t s  and adaptation level,  . t a  The adaptation level is 
the exponentially weighted sum of past consumption, in which recent consumption levels are 
given greater weight than more distant past consumption levels.
2 We interpret total utility,  , V  
as a measure of happiness over an extended period. Experienced utility or per period utility, v, 
is to be interpreted as a measure of happiness in the period of time under consideration 
(Kahneman, Wakker, and Sarin, 1997). Occasionally, in order to remove the effects of initial 
values, we will use the long-run values of experienced utility as a measure of happiness. If st is 
assumed to be constant over time, then we use S to denote the social comparison level. 
The carrier of utility is the gain or loss from the reference level. The reference level is 
determined by both past consumption and the social comparison level. Consider an example in 
which an individual has been consuming 6 units per period and his adaptation level has settled 
to 6 units. The average consumption level of his peer group is 10 units, and his social 
comparison level is simply the mean consumption of his peer group (10 units). Now the 
reference level for this individual, assuming 0.5, σ =  will be 0.5 x 6 + 0.5 x 10 = 8 units. If this 
individual were to consume 8 units, then the corresponding utility will be at the neutral level, 
                                              
2 Note that  xr −  can be written as xs σ −−   (1 ) σ − a σ = ( xs − )+(1 σ − )( xa − ). This last expression can be interpreted as an 
individual who uses not one  () r  but two reference points (s and a). The comparison of x with s receives weightσ , and the 
comparison with a receives weight  1 σ − . Because a is also a convex combination of past consumption levels, one 
can interpret that each level of past consumption serves as reference point, with different weights given to each 
comparison. Similarly, if s is understood as an average consumption in the society or in the peer group, then 
xs − could be seen as a multiple comparison with each group member.
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() ( ) 8 80 0. vv −= =  If he consumes more than 8 units, then the utility of current consumption 
will be positive; if he consumes less than 8 units, then the utility will be negative. 
When  1, σ = utility is determined solely by social comparison. Similarly, when  0, σ =  social 
comparison plays no role and utility is determined solely by adaptation. The relative weight 
given to adaptation and social comparison is likely to be domain specific. For example, social 
comparison for family life may play little to no role, as one does not readily observe this aspect 
of one’s peers’ lives. The utility one derives from a car, house, vacation or private school for 
children, however, is likely to be influenced by social comparison. 
The speed of adaptation is governed by  . α  For  1 α =  the adaptation is immediate and the most 
recent consumption will always serve as the adaptation level. For  0, α = there is no adaptation 
and the initial adaptation level,  1 a , serves as the reference adaptation in every period regardless 
of past consumption. Goods for which  0 α =  are called basic goods. Examples of basic goods 
include food, sleep, friendships and shelter. These goods are necessary for survival.
3 The study 
of basic goods and their contribution to well-being is not irrelevant, as a large percentage of 
the world population lives at subsistence level. For these people, more money, and therefore the 
provision of adequate food, shelter, clean water and health, could indeed improve happiness. 
The utility function, v , is assumed to be concave for consumption above the reference level 
and convex for consumption below the reference level (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). The 
neutral utility,  (0) 0, v =  is realized when consumption equals the reference level. In the next 
section, we explore the relationship between income and happiness in more depth. In all our 
numerical examples, we assume  () , 0 , vx x x
β =≥  and () , 0 vx x x
β
λ =− < , with  0.5 β =  and 
2.25. λ =  The parameter λ  measures the degree of loss aversion. With  2.25, λ =  a $10 loss 
gives the same magnitude of negative utility as a $22.5 gain. 
3. Income-Happiness Relationship 
 “A very poor, underprivileged person might think that it would be wonderful to have an 
automobile or a television set, and should he acquire them, at the beginning he would feel 
very happy. Now if such happiness were something permanent, it would remain forever. 
But it does not; it goes. After a few months he wants to change the models. The old ones, 
the same objects now cause dissatisfaction. This is the nature of change.” 
– Path to Tranquility, Dalai Lama, p. 175 
The above quote captures the essence of the “Easterlin Paradox,” which is an empirical finding 
that happiness scores have remained flat despite considerable increases in average income. The 
most striking example is Japan, where a five-fold increase in real per capita income has led to 
virtually no increase in average life satisfaction (Figure 2). A similar pattern holds for the 
United States (Figure 3) and for most other developed countries. 
 
                                              
3 For rich people or those in developed countries, food becomes an adaptive good used for social status (fine wine or 
a fancy restaurant) and not merely for nutrition. 
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Figure 2 
Satisfaction with Life and Income Per Capita in Japan between 1958 and 1991 
 















Happiness in these surveys is measured by asking people how satisfied they are with their lives. 
A typical example is the General Social Survey (Davis, Smith, and Marsden, 2001) which asks: 
“Taken all together, how would you say things are these days – Would you say that you are 
very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy?” In World Values Survey, Inglehart and colleagues 
(2000) use a 10-point scale, with one representing dissatisfied and 10 representing satisfied, to 
measure well-being. Pavot and Diener (1993) use five questions, each rated on a scale from one 




The Satisfaction with Life Scale (Pavot and Diener, 1993) 
DIRECTIONS: Below are five statements with which you may agree or disagree. 
Using the 1-7 scale below, indicate your agreement with each item by placing the appropriate 
number in the line preceding that item. Please be open and honest in your responding. 
1 = Strongly Disagree; 2 = Disagree; 3 = Slightly Disagree; 4 = Neither Agree nor Disagree; 5 = 
Slightly Agree; 6 = Agree; 7 = Strongly Agree 
_______ a)  In most ways my life is close to my ideal. 
_______ b)  The conditions of my life are excellent. 
_______ c)  I am satisfied with my life. 
_______ d)  So far I have gotten the important thing I want in life. 
_______ e)  If I could live my life over, I would change almost nothing. 
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Davidson, Jackson, and Kalin (2000) and Davidson and colleagues (2003) have found that when 
people are cheerful and experience positive feelings (funny film clips), there is more activity in 
the left front section of the brain. The difference in activity between the left and right sides of 
the prefrontal cortex seems to be a good measure of happiness. Self reported measurements of 
happiness correlate with this measure of brain activity, as well as with the ratings of one’s 
happiness made by friends and family members (Lepper, 1998). Diener and Tov (2005) report 
that subjective measures of well-being correlate with other types of measurements of happiness 
such as biological measurements, informant reports, reaction time, open ended interviews, 
smiling and behavior and online sampling. Kahneman, Krueger, Schkade, Schwarz, and Stone 
(2006) discuss biases in measuring well-being that are induced by a focusing illusion in which 
the importance of a specific factor (income, marriage, health) is exaggerated by drawing 
attention to the factor. Nevertheless, Kahneman and Krueger (2006) argue that self-reported 
measures of well-being may be relevant for future decisions as the idiosyncratic effect are likely 
to average out in representative population samples. Frey and Stutzer (2002b) conclude: “The 
existing research suggests that, for many purposes, happiness or reported subjective well-being 
is a satisfactory empirical approximation to individual utility.” 
 
Figure 3 










Source: Layard (2005). 
 
If people pursue the goal of maximization of happiness and they report their happiness levels 
truthfully in the variety of surveys discussed above, then how do we explain that happiness 
scores have remained flat in spite of significant increases in real income over time? Of course, 
happiness depends on factors other than income such as the genetic makeup of a person, family 
relationships, community and friends, health, work (unemployment, job security), external 
environment (freedom, wars or turmoil in society, crime) and personal values (perspective on 
life, religion, spirituality). Income, however, does influence a person’s happiness up to a point, 
and has a moderating effect on the adverse effects of some life events (Smith, Langa, Kabeto, 
and Ubel, 2005). As shown in Figure 4 mean happiness for a cross-section of Americans does 
increase with income, though at a diminishing rate. In fact, in any given society, richer people 
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Figure 4 








Source: diTella and MacCullouch (2006). 
 
Our model of adaptation and social comparison is consistent with the joint empirical finding 
that happiness over time does not increase appreciably in spite of large increases in real 
income, but happiness in a cross-section of data does depend on relative levels of income. 
 
Table 2 
Happiness According to Income Position 
 United  States  Britain 
  Tob Bottom Top Bottom 
(%)  Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter 
Very happy  45  33  40  29 
Quite happy  51  53  54  59 
Not too happy  4  14  6  12 
 100  100  100  100 
Source: Layard (2005). 
 
That rich people are happier than poor people at a given time and place is easy to justify by 
social comparison. By and large, richer people have a favorable evaluation of their own 
situation compared to others. In contrast, the economically disadvantaged will have an 
unfavorable evaluation of their relative position in the society. Needless to say, some rich 
people may bring misery upon themselves by comparing themselves with even richer people. 
Over time, though, both rich and poor people have significantly improved their living 
standards, but neither group has become happier. Adaptation explains this paradoxical finding. 
Consider Mr. Yoshi, a young professional living in Japan in the 1950s. He was content to live 
in his parents’ house, drive a used motorcycle for transportation, wash his clothes in a sink and 
listen to the radio for entertainment. Also consider Ms. Yuki, a young professional living in 
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own house, own automobile, washing machine, refrigerator and television. She travels abroad 
for vacation and enjoys expensive international restaurants. Mr. Yoshi was consuming 10 units 
of income per period, but had adapted to that level of consumption. Ms. Yuki consumes 50 
units of income per period and has adapted to consuming at that high level. Because Mr. Yoshi 
and Ms. Yuki are in similar social positions for their times, then both will have the same level 
of happiness. Happiness does not depend on the absolute level of consumption, which is 
substantially higher for Ms. Yuki. Instead, happiness depends on the level of consumption 
relative to the adaptation level. Ms. Yuki has adapted to a much higher level of consumption 
and therefore finds that she is no happier than Mr. Yoshi. Note that experienced utility, 
υ (x–r) (remains constant if income x increases from 10 units (Mr. Yoshi) to 50 units (Ms. 
Yuki) in steps of one unit each year because r also increases in steps of one unit each year.
4 
 
To demonstrate the role of adaptation and social comparison in determining utility experienced, 
we apply our model to the simple case of constant consumption plans. Suppose the social 
comparison level, S , and the initial adaptation level,  1 a , are both 10 units. The experienced 
utility in each period for persons A, B and C who have a constant consumption of 12, 10 and 8 
units, respectively, is plotted in Figure 5. Figure 5c shows that the poor person, C , will feel less 
dissatisfaction over time; whereas, the richer person, A, will experience diminished satisfaction. 
Both the poor and the rich person are adapting to their respective levels of consumption.  
Figure 5 
The Effect of Adaptation and Social Comparison on Experienced Utility. Panel (a) shows adaptation 
alone  () 0, 0 , ασ >= Panel (b) exhibits social comparison alone () 1, σ = and Panel (c) is a 








Two observations from Figure 5 are of special interest. First, with adaptation ( 0, 0, ασ >=  
Figure 5a) both the poor person, C , and the rich person, A, will converge to the neutral level of 
happiness as each becomes adapted to their own past consumption level. Second, with social 
comparison alone ( =1, σ  Figure 5b), the poor person, C, and the rich person, A, will remain 
far apart in happiness. More generally, dispersion in happiness will be about the same as the 
dispersion in income. This is also the prediction of the Discounted Utility Model, which is a 
particular case of the pure social comparison model with S = 0. 
                                              
4 If income increases at a geometric rate, say 4% per year, then he same conclusion is reached assuming income is 
measured in logs as suggested by Layard (2005). In this case, use  (( ) ( ) ) (/ ) v In x In r v x r −=  instead of   () v xr − in (1), 
and maintain the updating equations (2) and (3).  
2  Experienced Utility  2    Experienced Utility  2      Experienced Utility 
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Together, the two factors of adaptation and social comparison provide the more realistic 
prediction that the discrepancy in reference levels, and therefore in happiness, is less than the 
discrepancy in income. The reference levels are pulled towards the average consumption (12, 
10, or 8), but do not converge to the average consumption because of the permanent social 
comparison with S = 10. This prediction of our model is consistent with Easterlin, (1995, p. 42) 
who states that “the dispersion in norms [reference levels] appears to be, on average, less than 
that in incomes.” 
In Figure 6, the relationship between income and happiness is plotted for various weights, σ, on 
social comparison. We assume the initial adaptation and social comparison levels to be 10. The 
horizontal axis represents the constant consumption level, x. Note that  ( ) 0 vx r −= at 
10. xr ==  The vertical axis represents the long-run experienced utility, once the adaptation 
level has converged to x (assuming  0). α >  
By (2), the reference level, r, tends to  10( 1 ) x σσ +− , and therefore  xr −  tends to  (1 0 ) . x σ −  
Thus, the long-run experienced utility is given by  ( ( 10)). vx σ −  In the absence of social 
comparison ( 0), σ =  the long-run experienced utility is independent of income and flat at zero. As 
the weight on social comparison increases, the richer people ( 10) x > become happier and the 
poorer people ( 10) x <  become less happy. The happiness function is S-shaped and steeper for 
losses. Thus, for any rich person, say with x = 17, there is a symmetric poor person, at  3 x = , such 
that an increase in income of the poor person gives higher utility than increasing the income of the 
rich one. If individuals are equally weighted (utilitarian view), then the greatest gain in societal 
happiness is realized by improving the income of the person who is slightly below the average. If 
the worse-off individuals receive higher weight (rank utilitarian view) then this may not be the case. 
In Figure 6, we have assumed that the social comparison level is the same for a rich person as it is 
for a poor person. If, however, the peer group against which the social comparison is made 
changes with income level, then little gain in happiness may be realized. For example, if rich 
people compare themselves with other rich people, then S = x and experienced utility becomes 
zero. The double-edged sword of increasing adaptation level and increasing social comparison 
level may leave happiness unchanged even when income increases substantially. Conversely, if 
poor people are able to suppress social comparison, or compare themselves more often with even 
poorer individuals, then they may be able to partially overcome the predictions of Figure 6.  
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Figure 6 









The argument above does not prove that a rational person who optimally plans consumption by 
anticipating future adaptation levels will not be happier with more money. We merely have 
asserted above that if society becomes accustomed or adapted to higher levels of consumption 
as incomes rise (which will occur if the consumption plan is constant or not sufficiently 
increasing), then there will be no gain in observed happiness scores. We now examine the 
optimal consumption plan for the Adaptation-Social Comparison Model. 
4. Optimal Consumption Plan 
Suppose that a consumer wishes to optimally allocate an income, I, over consumption periods 
1,..., . t T =  For simplicity, assume δ  =  1 (no discounting), a constant unit price, and borrowing 
and saving at 0% interest. The consumer chooses  1 ( , ... ) T x x to solve the following optimization 
problem: 
 
 Max  1 ( , ... )  ( )
1
T













≤ ∑  (5) 
  0, 1,  ...,  , t x tT ≥=  (6) 
 
and  t r   satisfying the updating equations (2) and (3). 
The optimal consumption plan for the Discounted Utility Model is constant with 
/ , 1, ...,  . t x IT t T ==  For our Adaptation-Social Comparison Model, the optimal consumption 
plan depends on reference levels. Since reference levels are influenced by both adaptation and 
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we can always solve the mathematical program (4)-(6) to obtain the optimal consumption plan 
and the associated levels of per-period experienced utilities and total utility. 
To explicitly solve (4)-(6), it is convenient to define  . t tt z x r =− We can then simply redefine 
the problem as one of finding the optimal values of  , t z  as in the Discounted Utility Model, but 
with a modified budget constraint. To calculate the new budget constraint, note that for given 
values of  t z , one can easily recover the values of  t x  (and of  t r  and  1 t a + ,  1, ..., , t T = in a 
recursive manner by means of (2) and (3). Hence, each  t x   is a function of  , 1,  ..., . zt τ τ =  
Therefore, the budget constraint (5) can be written in terms of  , 1,  ..., . t z tT =  Such an 
expression for the budget constraint, however, is quite involved for the general model. 
It is possible to obtain a tractable expression for the special case of  1. α =  I n  t h i s  c a s e ,  
1 (1 ) , tt t r sx σσ − =+ −  so that xt=zt+rt=zt+σst+(1-σ)xt-1,xt-1=zt-1+σst-1+(1-σ)xt-2, …, and 
1 11 1 (1 ) . x zs a σσ =+ +−  It follows that: 
  1
1
(1 ) (1 ) ( ).
T tt







=− + − + ∑  (7) 
Plugging (7) into (5) yields the desired expression for the budget constraint as a function of zt: 
  01
1




K Kz s I a σ
=






(1 ) , 0,  ...,
Tt Tt Tt









=− = = ∑  (9) 
Using standard calculus, the first order condition is given by: 
 
  '( ) , 1,  ...,  . tt v zk t T λ ==  (10) 
 
Where λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with (8). 
Tf the constraint  0 t x > is met and v is concave, then the optimal solution is unique and is 
given by the solution of (10). This will also be the case if v is S-shaped, and the solution 
operates in the gains portion of the value function, i.e.,  0; t z ≥  otherwise, there may be 
multiple local optimal solutions. 
To gain further insights, we consider the case of a power value function,  () , 0 . vz z z
β =≥  In 
this case, 
1 '( ) / , v zz
β β
− =  and (10) becomes 
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Where  1
T






= =∑ Using (7) now yields  , 1, ...,  . t x tT =  
It is apparent from (12) that to ensure a level of consumption above the reference level 
(0 ) t z ≥ it is necessary for the social comparison levels and the initial adaptation level to be 
sufficiently low. Essentially, one needs to ensure that the numerator of (12) stays positive, 
or 01 (1 ) . k a I σΩ+ − ≤  Two special cases with σ = 0 and σ = 1 are instructive. When σ = 0, 
average income per period, I/T, above the initial adaptation level  1 a ensures consumption above 




= ∑ will also ensure that consumption in each period is above the ference level. Of course, if 
the level of social comparison is constant over time  12 ( ... ), T s ss S ====  this last condition 
reduces to average income per period greater than S. 
Even though (12) is derived using a power form for the value function, the conclusion that 
0 t z ≥  if the income is at least  0 (1 ) k σΩ+ − follows more generally from (8) and (10). If 
, 1, ..., , t z tT = is positive, and assuming  0, t s ≥ then it follows from (7) that the optimal 
consumption plan is increasing. 
If the social comparison level or the initial adaptation level are sufficiently high, 
01 ( 1) , k a I σΩ+ − > then the optimal solution involves some  0. t z <  This can yield complex 
patterns of consumption. Recall that consumption below the reference level implies that the 
consumer operates on the convex part of the value function. Therefore, the consumer will find 
it optimal to accumulate as much loss as possible in some periods. To do so, the individual will 
cease consumption in some intermediate periods, with the hope of lowering the adaptation 
level. Once the reference level is low enough, he may start an increasing consumption plan 
from then on. Numerical methods can be used to obtain the optimal consumption plans in these 
complex cases. 
In Figure 7, we present two possible optimal consumption plans for a fixed income of 100. In 
this example, 1 a  is set to 0 and S to 5. In Figure 7a, the optimal consumption plan is increasing. 
Reference levels and experienced utility are also increasing. In Figure 7b, there is a greater 
weight given to social comparison; the optimal consumption plan, while still increasing, is 
flatter and shows the moderating effect of social comparison. In the extreme case, when the 
weight of social comparison is set to one, the optimal plan will be flat. 
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Figure 7 











The key observation is that by anticipating the change in future reference levels induced by 
current consumption, a rational consumer could choose a consumption plan that may produce 
substantially higher total utility than a constant consumption plan (16.1 versus 12 when α = 1, 
σ = 0.2, Figure 7a). For a high σ, the optimal plan becomes flatter and therefore the total utility 
under the optimal plan and the constant consumption plan are close (17.9 versus 17.0 when α = 
1, σ = 0.5, Figure 7b). 
 
Figure 8 










For a given income, I, we can solve the consumption planning problem and find the total utility 
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and derive the indirect utility of income. In Figure 8, indirect utility of income is plotted for 
some specific values of parameters. It is clear from this figure that an increase in income to a 
richer person provides less incremental utility than the same increase would provide for a poor 
person. It is of special interest to note that indirect utility of income need not always be S-
shaped even if the per period utility function, v, is S-shaped. 
For  0 σ =  there is no social comparison, and a rational consumer derives a positive total utility 
for all values of income. For example for  20, I =  the total utility is 7.7. A person with  20 I =  is 
relatively poor because with an average consumption of 2 units per period he cannot keep up 
with the social comparison level of 5 units per period. As σ  increases, his utility decreases. 
With  1 σ =  such a poor person obtains a high negative total utility of 39. In contrast, a rich 
person ( 100) I = has a total utility of 17.1 for  0. σ =  Social comparison (1 ) σ =  also contributes 
to further increase his total utility to 22.4.   
  
Figure 9 
Indirect Utility of Optimal vs. Constant Consumption Plan 

































In Figure 9 we compare the utility derived from an optimal consumption plan with the utility 
derived from a constant consumption plan. As expected, the utility of the optimal plan is 
substantially higher than the utility of the constant consumption plan. Benefits of optimal 
plannin g seem to accr ue  more to relative ly p oorer people. For example, the gain in utility 
through optimal planning for a person with I = 40 is substantially higher [] 5.5 ( 7.3) 12.8 −− =  
than for a person with I = 60 [10.3-6.3=4]. A person below the average income of 50, but above 
the threshold of a 01 (1 )3 2 . 1 , ka σΩ+ − = can carefully choose an increasing consumption plan 
that yields positive experienced utility in all periods. However, under constant consumption, 
such a person consumes below the reference level, except for the first period, thereby realizing 
negative experienced and total utility. 
 
  
  =1; =0.2; S=5 ασ 
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5. Predicted Versus Actual Happiness 
“The great source of both the misery and disorders of human life, seems to arise from 
over- rating the difference between one permanent situation and another.” 
– Adam Smith, “The Theory of Moral Sentiments,” 1979, Part III, Chapter III 
So far we have seen that our Adaptation-Social Comparison Model is consistent with empirical 
findings that within a country richer people are happier than poorer people (social comparison), 
but that over time well-being does not increase in spite of permanent increases in income for 
all (adaptation). But the puzzle that we stated at the start of the paper still needs resolution. 
Lottery winners may not be happier (Brickman, Coates and Janoff-Bullman, 1978), but most 
people continue to believe that winning a lottery will make them happier. 
As we have demonstrated in Section 4, if people plan optimally, then more money indeed buys 
more happiness; though their happiness will increase at a diminishing rate. Optimal planning, 
however, requires that one should correctly predict the impact of current consumption on 
future utility. An increase in consumption has two perilous effects on future utility. First, the 
adaptation level goes up and therefore future experienced utility declines (e.g., people get used 
to a fancier car, a bigger house, or a vacation abroad). Second, the social comparison level may 
also go up, which again reduces experienced utility. When one joins a country club or moves to 
a more prosperous neighborhood, then the peer group with which social comparisons are made 
also changes. The individual now compares himself with more prosperous “Joneses” and 
comparisons to his previous peer group of less prosperous “Smiths” fades. If our lottery winner 
foresees all this, then he can appropriately plan consumption over time and realize high total 
utility in spite of a higher level of adaptation and an upward movement in peer group. The rub 
is that people underestimate adaptation and possibly changes in peer group. Loewenstein, 
O’Donoghue, and Rabin (2003) have documented and analyzed underestimation of adaptation 
and have called it projection bias. 
Because of projection bias, a person will realize less happiness than he thinks. The gap between 
predicted and realized levels of happiness (total utility) further increases if one plans myopically 
rather than optimally. An example of a myopic plan is to allocate a budget or income equally 
in each period (constant consumption), as opposed to an increasing plan. A worse form of 
myopic planning would be to maximize immediate happiness through splurging (large 
consumption early on); which is what some lottery winners presumably end up doing. 
We buy too much when hungry (Nisbett and Kanouse, 1968), forget to carry warm clothing 
during hot days for cooler evenings, predict that living in California will make us happy 
(Schkade and Kahneman, 1998) and generally project too much of our current state into the 
future and underestimate adaptation (Loewenstein and Schkade, 1999; Loewenstein, Read, and 
Baumeister, 2003; Gilbert, 2006). Van Praag and Frijters (1999) estimate a rise of between 35 
and 60 cents in what one considers required income for every dollar increase in income. Stutzer 
(2003) also estimates an increase in adaptation levels of at least 40 cents for each dollar 
increase in income. After the very first year, the joy of a one dollar increase in income is 
reduced by 40%, but people are unlikely to foresee this reduced contribution to happiness. 
People do qualitatively understand that some adaptation to change in lifestyle with higher 
income will take place; they simply underestimate the magnitude of the changes. 
In our model, the chosen consumption plan determines the actual reference level,  t r , by means 
of (2) and (3). In every period, subjects observe the current reference level, but may fail to  
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correctly predict the value of this state variable in future periods. According to projection bias, 
the predicted reference level is somewhere in between the current reference level and the actual 
reference level. The relationship between the actual and predicted reference levels can be 
modeled using a single parameter, π, as follows: 
Predicted Reference Level = π (Current Reference Level) + (1 − π) (Actual Reference Level) 
Thus, when π = 0, then there is no projection bias and the predicted reference level coincides 
with the actual reference level. If π = 1, then the person adopts the current reference level as the 
future reference level. An intermediate value of π = 0.5 implies that the person’s predicted 
reference level is halfway between the current and actual reference levels. The projection bias 
model can be extended to any state variables influencing preferences such as the satiation level 
(Baucells and Sarin, 2006a). If consumption stays above the actual reference level over time, 
then a person with projection bias may be surprised that the actual realized utility in a future 
period is lower than what was predicted. The reason, of course, is that the actual reference level 
is higher than anticipated. Actual happiness associated with higher levels of consumption may 
be much lower than what was hoped for. This gap may motivate the person to work even 
harder to increase his income in the hopes of improving happiness. But this chase for happiness 
through higher and higher consumption is futile as the reference level keeps on increasing. 
To formalize these ideas, let τ be the current period. The actual and predicted reference levels 
for a subsequent period t are rt and  , ˆ , t r τ respectively. Now, 
, ˆ (1 ) , t t r rr ττ ππ =+ −  
where  t r  follows the dynamics governed by (2) and (3). The actual utility is given by the chosen 
consumption plan according to the Adaptation-Social Comparison Model; however the chosen 
consumption plan might not be optimal under projection bias. The reason is that, in period τ , 
the individual will maximize the predicted utility at τ , given by: 








=− ∑          (13) 
The difference between actual and predicted utility can be demonstrated by a simple example. 
Suppose a person plans a constant consumption of x units per period. In the first period, the 
utility realized is  () vx if  1 0. r =  If his projection bias is extreme (1 ) , π =  he will predict no 
changes in reference levels,  1,2 1,3 1, ˆˆ ˆ0 T rr r == == "  and a utility of  () vx for the second and 
remaining periods. But the actual reference level  2 r in Period 2 will be greater than 0 for any 
0 α >  and it will be x for α = 1. Thus, the actual utility will be between v(0) and v(x) for any 
0, 0. απ >>  The gap between the predicted and actual utility for Period 2 onward will be 
() ( 0 ) v xv −  for the extreme case of  1. απ == This is the sort of dilemma lottery winners face. 
Because of projection bias, they overrate the difference between their predicted and actually 
realized levels of happiness. 
We now consider consumption planning under projection bias. We set π  =  0.5, fix the budget 
at I  = 100, assume no initial adaptation  1 (0 ) , a =  and set the social comparison level to S = 10. 
A person with projection bias maximizes (13) at  1. τ =  He obtains  1,1 1,2 1, ˆˆ ˆ ( , , ... ) T x xx = as the 
optimal plan where  , ˆ t xτ  is the consumption at time t as planned at period τ . In Table 3, a 
consumption plan with projection bias for Period 1 is shown in the first row. This person 
implements  1,1 ˆ 5.8 x =  and now solves (13) again with a reduced budget of  ¨1,1 ˆ 94.2. Ix −=  The  
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solution now gives  2,2 2,3 1, ˆˆ ˆ ( , , ... ) T x xx =  and  2,2 ˆ  8.5 x = is implemented (second row of Table 3). 
Note that the consumption in Period 2 is revised upward from 8.1 (Period 1 plan for Period 2) 
to 8.5. Upon reaching Period 3, the person realizes that the actual reference level is higher than 
what he had thought earlier, so he optimizes again with this new information. The available 
budget is now  1,1 2,2 ˆˆ85.8. Ix x −− =  By repeatedly solving (13), we obtain  1,1 2,2 , ˆˆ ˆ ( , , ... ). TT xx x =  
Table 3 










Note that the person with projection bias is forward looking and does plan optimally except for 
using his predicted reference levels in arriving at the consumption plan. A consequence of such 
a plan, for example, is that he may over-consume in early periods if he underestimates changes 
in future reference levels. So at an intermediate period, he has used up a lot more budget than 
he would have used had he predicted reference levels accurately. The projection bias 
consumption plan is therefore flatter than the optimal consumption plan under no projection 
bias. In Table 3, the projection bias plan  , ˆ (Actual ) xττ is compared to the optimal plan () . t x
∗  As 
expected, the person is over-consuming in early periods compared to the optimal plan. Under 
projection bias, the actual total utility (8.4) may be lower than the optimal total utility (11.7), 
and is much lower than the predicted total utility (21.1) in Period 1. 
In Figure 10, the predicted and actual total utilities for different levels of income are shown. 
The difference between predicted and actual utility increases significantly as the projection bias 
increases from  0.5 π = to  1. π =  It is clear that people think that more money will buy them a 
lot more happiness than it actually does. 
 











5.8  8.1  9.0  9.4  9.6  9.7  9.8  10.2  11.4  17.0 
–  8.5  9.5  10.0  10.1  10.2  10.3  10.5  11.1  13.9 
–  –  9.7  10.2  10.4  10.5  10.6  10.7  11.0  12.5 
–  –  –  10.3  10.6  10.7  10.8  10.8  11.0  11.8 
–  –  –  –  10.6  10.8  10.8  10.9  11.0  11.6 
–  –  –  –  –  10.8  10.9  10.9  11.0  11.4 
–  –  –  –  –  –  10.9  10.9  11.0  11.4 
–  –  –  –  –  –  –  11.0  11.0  11.4 
–  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  11.1  11.4 











Actual  , ˆ xττ  5.8  8.5  9.7  10.3  10.6  10.8  10.9  11.0  11.1  11.4  – 
 
Optimal   
*
t x  
 
2.5  4.5  6.1  7.5  8.7  9.8  10.9  12.3  14.7  23.1  100 
 
 [] 1;0 , 2 ;0 , 5 ;1 0 ; 1 0 0 SI ασ π == = = = 
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Figure 10 



























If we are wired to underestimate adaptation, then there is little we can do about our incorrect 
predictions of future state. But we can at least be forward looking and account for the effects of 
current consumption on future utility. A myopic planner who uses the heuristic of constant 
consumption will realize even less total utility and suffer from a bigger gap between predicted 
and realized happiness (Herrnstein and Prelec, 1992). Ironically, the DU model with no 
discounting will prescribe the same erroneous conclusion as the optimal consumption plan is 
flat, thereby realizing much less happiness than what would have been predicted and a great 
deal of disappointment. 
6. Happiness and Budget Allocation 
To gain further insight into the relationship between happiness and income, consider a simple 
model in which one allocates a fixed budget between two goods. The first good is an adaptive 
good, whereas the second good is a basic good for which the reference level remains constant. 
The overall utility is additively separable between the two goods. The optimization problem is: 
1





wvx r wvx r
=
−+ − − ∑  
1







+≥ ∑  
Where 
a
t r  is determined by the usual updating equation. If  1/2, ω =  then the adaptive good, A, 
will provide less utility because reference levels increase due to past consumption. The basic 
good, B, provides a greater utility throughout as long as consumption is above its constant 
reference level () .
b r   
1; 0.2; 0.5; /10 SI ασ π == = =   Income 1; 0.2; 1; /10 SI ασ π == ==   Income  
 
IESE Business School-University of Navarra - 21 
Figure 11 
Consumption of Adaptive (A) and Basic (B) Goods under Projection Bias. The reference level for Good 
B is set to  4
































In Figure 11, the optimal allocation of a fixed budget of  100 I =  is compared to the allocation 
that results from projection bias. In this example, we set  4;
b r =  meaning, a per-period 
consumption of at least 4 units of the basic good is required to experience positive utility. For 
the optimal allocation, the adaptive good, A, receives a low allocation in early periods to keep 
reference levels under control. The consumption plan for Good A is increasing over time (see 
Figure 11a). The basic good, B, in contrast, receives a constant income allocation of about 7 
units per period (see Figure 11b). 
Under projection bias, the person over-consumes the adaptive good, A, in early periods, which 
raises the reference levels for later periods. In order to keep up with the increased reference levels of 
Good A, more and more budget is allocated to it at the expense of the basic good, B. The total 
utility under projection bias is 8.2 units compared to the total utility of 12 units that is obtained 
under optimal planning. 
 
Table 4 







       
40 94  91 
50 89  82 
60 82  79 
70 77  62 
80 73  56 
90 70  51 
100 68  47 
 
1; 0; 0.5; 0.67 w ασ π === =   (a)  Period 2 0; 0; 0.5; 1 0.33 w ασ π === − =  (b)    Period  
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We can perform this analysis for several levels of income. Table 4 shows the relationship 
between income, I , and percent allocation of income to the basic good, B. Under the optimal 
plan, the percent allocation to the basic good decreases as income increases; this is also the 
case under projection bias. Under projection bias, however, a far smaller percentage of income 
(compared to the optimal plan) is allocated to the basic good. As shown in Figure 12, the net 
result is that the actual realized utility at every income level is lower. This misallocation is even 
greater for higher levels of income as realized utility becomes flatter as income increases. 
No one would shed a tear if the rich realized less total utility because they overspent on fancy 
cars, luxury houses or expensive hotels. A consequence of projection bias, though, is that even 
for poorer segments of society, a greater than optimal allocation is made to addictive goods 
such as alcohol, drugs and lottery tickets, thereby leaving them with less of their budget for 
basic goods such as nutritious food and hygiene. 
 
Figure 12 
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7. Conclusions 
In this paper, we have proposed a model of adaptation and social comparison for valuing time 
streams of consumption. This model explains two widely observed empirical findings in the 
well-being literature. The first empirical finding is that within a society richer people are 
happier than poorer ones. The second finding is that for a given country, average well-being 
has not improved over time in spite of large gains in per capita income. The second finding is 
not universal, since in some countries (e.g., Italy and Denmark) the average well-being has 
improved, though in the majority of countries, including the United States, there has not been 
an appreciable increase in average well-being. 
At the individual level, well-being even for lottery winners who had won from $50,000 to 
$1,000,000 within the previous year was rated at an average of 4 points, compared to 3.8 
points for a control group, on a 5-point scale. Further, these lottery winners rated daily 
activities as less pleasurable than the control subjects did. This finding is dramatic and counter-
intuitive as most people believe that they would be happier if they won the lottery or even 
obtained a 20% raise in income. 
We therefore posed a slight modification to the Easterlin puzzle: Why do people believe that 
more money will buy more happiness when in fact it does not? We show that under projection 
bias this puzzle is resolved as a person will predict much more happiness than he will actually 
realize because of his failure to account for changes in reference levels that accompany higher 
levels of consumption. 
Finally, we show that a greater emphasis on basic goods, rather than adaptive goods, will 
improve happiness. Basic goods include food, shelter, sleep, friendship, spiritual activities, etc. 
Great discipline is required, however, to give adequate importance to basic goods. Projection 
bias will divert resources from basic goods toward adaptive goods even under rational 
planning. It might be interesting to examine whether activities that provide a better perspective 
on life (meditation or other spiritual practices) would be able to reduce projection bias in some 
cases.  
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